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To analyze the relationship between globalization and labour protest, this paper compares labour 
politics in three regions: the highly globalized southeast ‘sunbelt’, the relatively less ‘reformed’, barely 
globalized, and decaying Manchurian rustbelt, and the broadly ‘reformed’ but only partially 
globalized and still largely domestically-oriented areas that make up most of the rest of the country, 
represented in this chapter by the city of Tianjin, the site of the author’s field research. For each, we 
will identify key dimensions of labour politics. This political configuration forms our explanandum, 
which is fleshed out region by region. The paper then seeks the explanans of these salient similarities 








The cheap prices of commodities are the heavy artillery with which 
[capitalism] batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the 
barbarians’ intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It 
compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois 
mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls 
civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In 
one word, it creates a world after its own image. 
 
– Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
The Communist Manifesto  
 
 
Marx and Engels were right as far as they went, and they’d probably be the first to 
welcome the criticism that their formulation did not fully appreciate the power of the dialectic they 
hypothesized. European countries lost money on the China trade until the middle of the nineteenth 
century. Their well-heeled consumers demanded luxuries such as tea, spices, art, crafts and porcelain 
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(‘china’) while Chinese elites, with the help of government trade restrictions, found little worth 
buying from Europe. In 1793, the Qian Long Emperor rebuffed a British trade delegation led by 
Lord McCartney, writing with infinite and perhaps ironic condescension to McCartney’s boss King 
George III: ‘If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, 
this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to dispatch them from afar...As 
your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or 
ingenious, and have no use for your country’s manufactures.’ Foreshadowing US-China trade today, 
Britain ran up a significant trade deficit with China, and silver began to flow east to cover it. British 
compradores finally did identify a commodity that would create its own high demand in China, and 
Chinese efforts to prevent the trade resulted in the disastrous Opium War.1 Having literally battered 
down the walls militarily and politically, European and then American and Japanese merchants were 
soon prying open the Chinese market with all manner of cheap commodities. In the wake of the 
Sino-Japanese War at the end of the nineteenth century, foreigners actually began to manufacture in 
China. 
Was the country heading for ‘underdevelopment’? Here the masters would prove 
masterful with their resounding ‘no’: China would be compelled to become bourgeois too. And so it 
did, taking its first steps on the long, convoluted road to capitalism with surprising celerity. By 1933, 
the new Chinese bourgeoisie owned 67 percent of the country’s industrial factories, which employed 
73 percent of its industrial labour. Rural handicraft production was not devastated the way it was in 
India (where it prompted Gandhi’s iconic promotion of cotton spinning). In the 1930s, the volume 
of imported goods (other than textiles) that could compete with rural handicrafts was less than 5 
percent of the volume of handicraft production. 
China’s transition to capitalism was, of course, stopped dead by the revolution and three 
decades of Maoist state socialism. But beginning tentatively in 1978, and going into high gear only 
after 1992, national capitalism came roaring back. Completing the dialectic that Marx and Engels 
did not explicitly foresee, today China is battering down walls worldwide with its own cheap 
commodities, in the process recreating the trade surplus it ran in pre-industrial times, albeit now on 
an unimaginably larger, wider and more dynamic scale. The clear beneficiaries have been the Chinese 
state and the renascent bourgeoisie. But what about the working class? 
The debate about whether globalization is good or bad for workers, in China or any 
‘emerging market’, is not just tiresome but methodologically vexed. For example, from 2001 to 
2006, average manufacturing wages in China’s more domestically-oriented northeast rose 90 percent, 
while those in Guangdong rose only 46 percent.2 A critic could argue that this shows that 
globalization is worse than import-substitution for workers. But most of the Guangdong workers 
were new rural migrants with almost no cash income at all before they came to their sweatshops, 
whereas in 2001 those in the northeast were already employed or were urban school-leavers from 
families with non-trivial cash incomes. Both would be right. 
The debate is also misguided. Rising wages can, of course, be perfectly consistent with 
even faster-rising exploitation. And in practice, that is precisely what has happened in China. 
Manufacturing profits in China’s most globalized areas and sectors along the coast have risen far 
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more than in other parts of the country. This suggests that the surplus value produced by these 
workers in the globalized sector has surely been far greater than in the domestically-oriented 
industry, and that it has provided the major material basis for the explosion of the Chinese economy 
and its new bourgeoisie. 
And yet the working class’3 political response to globalization at the point of production 
has, on the whole, been broadly acquiescent in two senses. First, workers have almost never 
challenged the profound structural transformation from state socialism, under which they had 
achieved considerable power on the shop floor and material benefits, to capitalism that has deprived 
them of both and, indeed, driven millions into unemployment. This is all the more striking in view 
of the definite and often genuine radicalism of working class politics in the Maoist period.4 Second, 
while strikes and demonstrations have occurred, they have only involved a very small portion of the 
working class, and have almost never produced protest waves linking up workers beyond their factory 
walls. 
Yet the question to ask is not whether working class contention in China represents 
heroic working class action, however sporadic, in the face of a repressive state in a country that 
utterly lacks any space for self-organization of civil society, or, by contrast, disappointing proletarian 
capitulation and defeat. Whether the glass is part empty or part full is a matter shot through with too 
much ideological, political and even psychological predisposition. The more methodologically 
possible and analytically appropriate questions are to do with the nature of working class resistance – 
their participants, issues, discourses, repertoires and loci. And to home in on the effect of 
globalization, these questions can be raised in comparative analysis of China’s more and less 
globalized sectors, locales and enterprises.  
There is a further and often unacknowledged methodological difficulty here. Such an 
analytical strategy must be able to distinguish the effects of globalization from those of the wider 
process of structural ‘reform’5 of the Chinese economy, of which it is only a part, albeit a crucially 
important one. 
To attack this problem, we will compare labour politics in three regions: the highly 
globalized southeast ‘sunbelt’, the relatively less ‘reformed’, barely globalized, and decaying 
Manchurian rustbelt, and the broadly ‘reformed’ but only partially globalized and still largely 
domestically-oriented areas that make up most of the rest of the country, represented in this chapter 
by the city of Tianjin, site of the author’s field research. For each, we will identify key dimensions of 
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Taken together, this political configuration forms our explanandum. The next section fleshes it out 
region by region. The following section attempts to explain these salient similarities and differences, 
focusing on the key question of labour’s level of resistance, in terms of the nature of the prevailing 
political economy, sociological factors such as generation and social space, and the role of the state. 
 
 
Labour Politics: Three Patterns 
 
THE SOUTHEAST: GLOBALIZED DESPOTISM 
In the vast majority of export-oriented firms of southeast China, there is labour peace. Most 
of the workers are young rural migrants, many female. They tend to come from poorer villages and 
towns where there is little gainful employment in agriculture or local industry to be had. The modal 
pattern is that they stay for a few years after leaving middle school, remitting income back home. 
When the time comes for them to marry, they often return home, since it is difficult to find a spouse 
in the city, especially one with an urban household registration without which it is difficult to 
establish a working and social life there over the long term. Generally these late teenagers and early 
twenty-somethings are (ware)housed in dormitories on factory grounds. They often work long shifts 
of ten or twelve hours a day, six or seven days a week. Most of the factories do not have branches of 
 96
the state-run All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), Communist Party committees, or 
worker representative assemblies – the standard complement of political institutions in state- and 
collective-sector firms. 
The regime of accumulation is the despotic capitalism resembling in many respects that 
of Marx’s day. Firms both smaller and larger operate within a highly competitive, largely unregulated 
environment. They are pressurized by ease and low costs of entry, ‘just in time’ technology, rapidly 
shifting demand, and intense pressures from buyers, including monopsonistic ones like Wal-Mart 
(for which firms have been known to produce for significant periods at a loss since the alternative is 
shutting down altogether). This makes for a highly draconian regime of sweated labour, as capital 
struggles for every possible quantum of surplus value. Piece-rate and overtime wage systems are 
carefully calibrated. Tight discipline is maintained through the dormitory system, intensive 
surveillance on the shop floor, strict regulation of bathroom and meal breaks, and the like. Workers 
are often required to put down hiring deposits in order to minimize turnover. Safety takes a back 
seat. Factory doors are kept locked, which has caused significant casualties when fires have broken 
out.6 
When it occurs, labour conflict here is generally focused on the material struggle over pay 
and labour process, i.e., between labour and capital over surplus value. Protest has often taken legal 
forms such as mediation, arbitration and litigation (Lee, 2007: 176-191). But it has also turned into 
contentious wildcat strikes, which of course are illegal. These normally occur in a cellular fashion, 
factory by factory, though there have been a small number of incidents in which workers in nearby 
factories demonstrate briefly in solidarity. Only rarely have they become politicized in the sense of 
expanding their terrain, much less their target, to the local government. In one typical case, 
management instituted a new time card system to help advance its position in the struggle within the 
economy of labour time by requiring workers to punch out and in at lunch time. This cost workers a 
precious ten minutes on either end of what had only been a thirty-minute break, essentially reducing 
their free time by two-thirds to a mere ten minutes. So they struck, demanding their time back and 
then expanding their agenda to a demand that the firm also observe minimum wage and overtime 
laws. Thousands of workers were involved, the strike lasted five days, at one point the manager was 
nearly beaten, and several strikers were arrested. In another case, in 2005 and 2006 management 
responded to successive rises in government-set minimum wage by jacking up production quotas, 
taxing workers beyond human endurance limits. When in 2007 the government did not again raise 
the minimum wage, and workers did not receive their expected annual raise, they struck in their 
thousands (Chan and Pun, 2009). 
 
THE DECAYING NORTHEAST 
Manchuria was China’s first heavy industrial heartland. Japan invested in large factories 
there as early as the end of the nineteenth century, after it won the right to do so in the 1895 Treaty 
of Shimonoseki that concluded the Sino-Japanese War. The Maoist state continued to build it up, 
featuring two of its enterprises – the Anshan Steel Works and the Daqing Oilfield – as national 
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models. Under the structural reforms, gargantuan state enterprises such as these did not fare well. In 
the 1980s their management and supervising ministries, ambivalent about the radical changes being 
mooted, and continuing to face only timid economic incentives and, in terms of the all-important 
price structure, actual disincentives to transform themselves, to were slow to adapt. They also 
continued to maintain the Maoist period’s relatively thick presence of party and neighborhood 
committees, union offices, and worker representative assemblies. By the 1990s, when globalization of 
the Chinese economy took off, most were not in a position either to attract significant foreign 
investment or to produce exportable products (such as the high-tech specialty steels rolling out of 
South Korea). As cheap input prices set in the Maoist period to promote heavy industry were 
gradually freed to market levels, as government subsidies for their losses dried up, and as these firms 
continued to struggle under the weight of providing extensive social welfare benefits for their aging 
work force, they began to shed labour through layoffs and early retirement buyouts.7 Downsizing 
and bankruptcies became rife. Some managers, seeing the writing on the wall, quietly stripped their 
enterprises’ assets and salted away or made away with the proceeds. 
This toxic mix of a dying industrial heartland that was once the pride of the country, and 
the incompetence, laziness or dishonesty of its bloated management and political apparatus, has 
produced among workers both overarching despair leading to grudging silence, but also fury that has 
fueled the largest and most politicized proletarian protests in China in recent years, and the only 
ones that seriously threatened to metastasize into potentially destabilizing protest waves. In March of 
2002, when China’s National People’s Congress was holding its annual session, tens of thousands of 
laid-off workers in Heilongjiang Province’s Daqing, the oilfield that was the Maoist-era model of 
industrial development from which the whole country was exhorted to learn, protested arbitrary 
cutbacks in their already paltry severance packages. They blocked a railway and laid siege to the 
PetroChina headquarters. Unprecedented solidarity demonstrations were held at the Liaohe Oilfield 
in neighboring Liaoning Province, but also much further afield at the almost equally famous Shengli 
Oilfield in Shandong and clear across the country in Xinjiang. An alarmed government called in not 
just the armed police but a proper army tank regiment. 
Simultaneously, next door in Liaoning Province over 10,000 workers of the Liaoyang 
Ferro-Alloy Factory took to the streets and public squares demonstrating against wage arrears and 
benefit shortfalls resulting from alleged management misappropriation of funds that had led to the 
plant’s bankruptcy. They were soon joined by thousands of workers from several other failing 
Liaoyang plants, another largely unprecedented and, for the government, dangerous development. 
Moreover, the protests went beyond the original demonstrations’ economic demands by becoming 
overtly political, demanding the dismissal of Gong Shangwu, the former Liaoyang mayor and Party 
secretary who was at that very moment representing the city at the National People’s Congress in the 
capital. Even after the large initial protests were brought to an end with a combination of carrot and 
stick – specifically, economic concessions plus arrest of the protest leaders – significant protests 
dragged on for months demanding the release of the imprisoned workers. In the successive weeks, 
thousands of miners in Fushun and Fuxin, also in Liaoning, threatened to block railway lines in 
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Adaptive Tianjin and Beyond 
Tianjin is broadly similar to many other parts of China in which much of the old state 
socialist sector has managed to adapt to the structural reforms through managerial and technological 
upgrading and the formation of joint ventures with foreign firms. New private or mixed-ownership 
enterprises, some Chinese and some foreign-invested, have also developed. Foreign investment has 
focused on production for China’s internal market as well as for export. That helps make the 
economic environment for capital – and therefore for labour – less intensely competitive and 
pressurized than in the southeast. To be sure, economic restructuring has led to layoffs, early 
retirement buyouts, and factory closures or consolidations. But on the whole the economy has been 
buoyant enough to provide a way out for many affected workers. Some have taken jobs in the 
expanding private or foreign sector, while others have become self-employed. Indeed, workers in 
state-run firms that have gotten into economic difficulty due to the structural reforms generally see 
globalization as holding out hope for a foreign investor to save their plant. Older laid off or 
prematurely retired state sector workers who have been unable to find work have usually managed to 
scrape by, often by relying on help from grown children, who are, in turn, generally earning enough 
in the growing economy to support them. Moreover, the city government has had sufficient 
resources to support the cost of benefits promised to such people. For all these reasons, the level of 
labour protest in Tianjin and places like it is lower than in the northeast or the southeast.9 
 
 
Labour’s Responses to Structural Reform and Globalization: Three Patterns 
Overall, then, the Chinese structural reforms have produced distinct patterns of capitalist 
development, which have in turn shaped different labour responses. The level of globalization 
appears to be a major explanans but in fact may not be the most important one. First, a highly 
globalized, export-oriented, hyper-competitive economy, centered in the southeast has produced a 
despotic labour regime relying on migrant labour. In turn workers have responded with broad 
quiescence punctuated by legal measures as well as mainly cellular, enterprise-based strikes and 
protests focusing on bread-and-butter issues and discourse. This complex concatenation can be 
encapsulated by the shorthand ‘despotism.’ Second, in what might be called ‘decay’, a failing 
state-run, import-substituting, heavy industrial sector, characteristic of the northeast, has left a 
labour force of younger, middle-aged and older workers facing unemployment and the prospect of 
surviving primarily on meager state benefits. This too has produced broad quiescence alongside 
occasional large, more politicized, and, briefly, metastatic protest when jobs were lost or 
unemployment benefits reduced. Third is an ‘adaptive’ pattern. Here a mixed economy of state and 
collective enterprises that have managed to adjust to the new market forces on the one hand, and 
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newer private or joint-venture enterprises, some Chinese and some foreign funded, on the other, has 
developed. It relies both on internal and export markets. In places like Tianjin, it has produced solid 
growth without the cutthroat competition driving capitalists to sweat labour. Workers have enjoyed 
a smoother transition, avoiding both being abused and cast aside. The adaptive pattern has therefore 
engendered a lower level of labour protest than despotism or decay. 
Put this way, the analysis is in danger of excessive, potentially vulgar materialist 
explanation. In fact, a complex set of economic, social and political explanans are also at work in 






Labour has responded simultaneously in three apparently contradictory ways to 
globalization-driven despotism in China. Workers have lapped it up, as millions upon millions of 
rural migrants have streamed into the urban export platforms clamoring for work. They have for the 
most part endured the drudgery and degradation of the work with grudging though generally 
uncomplaining acquiescence. And they have occasionally fought back, and even sometimes lashed 
out, in a small number of cases of egregious abuse. Most generally and abstractly, the theory of 
exploitation explains why workers submit ‘freely’ to ‘wage slavery’. First, they are driven into the 
wage relationship by economic compulsion, and then the fact that exploitation takes place in a 
‘hidden abode’ helps obfuscate the asymmetry between labour and capital. What they see is, as the 
neo-liberals emphasize, their higher incomes. What neither they nor the neo-liberals see nearly as 
clearly, if at all, is the surplus value appropriated from them. This helps explain why Chinese 
migrants have flocked into the draconian world of despotic capitalism and suffered there mostly in 
silence. 
What Marx was perhaps less good at grasping was the conditions under which workers 
would actually resist. He seemed to think opposition would emerge organically out of the dialectic of 
the capitalist labour process (which forces workers to co-operate the factory, leading to wider 
cooperation), the homogenization of social life, and capitalist crisis. There may be some truth to all 
of this – workers learned to unionize and form rich working class cultures and solidarities in many 
countries, especially at moments of crisis –  though their resistance was generally neither 
revolutionary nor powerful enough to win significant gains. But this approach is also too general. 
What is implicit but perhaps not sufficiently explicit in Marx’s theory is the proposition that 
working class resistance requires that the process of exploitation, which is normally opaque, become 
transparent. In Chinese despotic, globalized capitalism, what has set off resistance is not the 
quotidian misery of factory life itself, but a series of events that drag exploitation from its ‘hidden 
abode’ out into the open. In the first case discussed in these pages by Pun Ngai, workers who did not 
resist the appropriation of surplus value day in day out nonetheless rose to their feet and found their 
voice when, in the usually obfuscated struggle over labour time, they lost twenty out of thirty 
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minutes they had previous had. In the second case, they became incensed when management 
stopped its practice sharing some of its increasing profits (grounded in growing amounts of 
appropriated surplus value from productivity gains) with the workers, leaving them with a precisely 
measurable decline in their expected income. It is only at that point that workers can, as Pun shows, 
take advantage of the way the labour process and the social and cultural spaces created by despotic 
capitalism enabled workers to act collectively. Put the other way around, unless the exploitation was 
made transparent, the highly exploited migrant workers of Shenzhen would in general continue 
quietly to turn out masses of surplus value. 
Such abstract theory can help explain, then, why migrants flock to, generally acquiesce 
in, but also occasionally resist dreadfully despotic labour in China’s globalized south. It is worth 
noting that globalization is not intrinsic to the theory. It could and does apply just as well to 
domestic despotic Chinese firms producing for the home market. Rather, the theory has implications 
for globalization, by pointing out the conditions under which workers seek, endure and may resist it. 
Specifically, where, as in south China, globalization produces intense levels of competition that 
induce capital to take a despotic measures on the shop floor that bring exploitation – the extraction 




The material basis of working class protest under conditions of economic decay is utterly 
different. Like workers everywhere living amidst rapid economic decline, the Manchurian proletariat 
would love to be exploited in regular work, and those who manage to cling to the opportunity are 
generally uncomplaining about it. Resistance has occurred mainly when work has disappeared, 
workers have had to settle for being merely sustained at a subsistence level by the state, and that 
sustenance has been threatened. Here moral economy has more explanatory power than Marxist 
political economy. E. P. Thompson and James Scott have theorized respectively that resistance in 
early capitalist and peasant societies flows mainly from the revocation, forced by rising market forces, 
of preexisting moral codes that protected poor working people for centuries. And the resistance tends 
to turn quickly to rage because of both the moral element as well as the material fact that those who 
relied for their very lives on the traditional protections – likened by Scott to people up to their necks 
in water – now face the prospect of disaster.10 
State socialism guaranteed the working class employment and the modest wages and 
comprehensive benefits that came with it. Workers came to regard their work and income as a moral 
and political right provided by socialism. With the advent of the structural reforms, they had little or 
no way to provide for themselves without such employment. Some were too old. For those still of 
working age, the local economy was in crisis, and they certainly could not afford to move away and 
lose their factory-supplied housing, however miserable it was. All this can help explain why the 
protests occurred when they did, at a moment when the last vestiges of these state socialist rights 
were being withdrawn, and also why they so quickly reached a high dudgeon of moral and political 
fury not seen in the strikes in despotic southern factories. It can also contribute to an explanation of 
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the higher level of politicization of protest. In the decaying northeast, the moral and political right to 
stable employment and livelihood was created by the revolution and the socialist state, and thus 
could only be withdrawn by that state. And in material terms, even former workers depended on the 
state for their retirement or unemployment benefits, housing, health care, and education for their 
children or grandchildren. Finally, this theory sheds light on the metastatic tendency of protest 
under decay. Since the moral and political right and set of material benefits had been provided to all 
workers and former workers, its withdrawal affected a broader swath of the local working class. 
Returning to the question of globalization, decaying areas like China’s northeast are, as we 
have noted, only weakly linked at best to the international economy. Globalization may be 
considered responsible for the situation only at several removes: once the Chinese economy opened 
to the world, much of its former state socialist sector could not compete. Or it could only compete 
by abrogating the state socialist labour regime of guaranteed employment and benefits. In China, 
labour market reform was pioneered by foreign-invested firms (Gallagher 2005). But globalization is 
only one factor responsible for the decay of former state-owned industry. These firms proved unable 
to adapt to the new marketizing environment introduced around 1980, long before they actually 
began to face direct global competition. And even if they had been healthy and efficient, in the 
1990s they still would have laid off workers whether they needed to or not: in a stunning example of 
the stubborn commandist bureaucratism that still plagues China, in recent years profitable, 
prosperous state-owned enterprises in China’s central coast have followed orders to lay off workers 
even if they did not have labour surpluses (Hurst 2009). In Chinese industry layoffs and 
restructuring more generally often have their own inner origins that are not attributable to 
globalization, or even for that matter to economic forces. 
 
ADAPTATION 
In places like Tianjin, the lower level of labour resistance to globalization and to 
structural reform more generally is due, as we have seen, in part to the capacity of the economy to 
generate enough alternative employment and modalities for taking care of the unemployed. But 
there is something deeper and more structural as well. Many former employees of state enterprises – 
especially those in struggling firms where pay is low and security questionable – actually experienced 
their layoffs positively. They appreciated the opportunity to choose their own work. Some welcomed 
the tradeoff of working in a globalized firm, with its more arduous pace and even draconian shop 
floor regime, in return for higher pay. This includes both those who left willingly or greeted their 
layoff with equanimity as well as those who feared being left flat but prayed successfully for an 
international investor to buy out their dying state enterprise. Others appreciated the existential 
benefits of self-employment, even if that meant just driving a taxi.11 From the point of view of many 
workers in adaptive economic environments, structural reform and globalization, while not ushering 
in a neo-liberal nirvana, did in the end provide a welcome enough departure from the cosseted but 






The young migrants employed in southeastern despotism were born in the 1980s, when the ‘iron 
rice bowl’ of guaranteed employment and social welfare was already being consigned to the scrap 
heap of history. Having heard about it from their parents or grandparents is, of course, not nearly 
enough for them to develop a full appreciation of what it meant, much less to experience their 
working lives as a loss of such proletarian rights, privileges or victorious spoils. Moreover, the 
accounts of the state socialist past that have come down to them are just as likely to include horror 
stories or dark whisperings about the Cultural Revolution. For them there is little if any ‘radiant past’ 
(Burawoy and Lukács 1992). Instead, their world is one of purer economic calculus, to which they 
react, as we have seen, with a mixture of acquiescence and occasional protest, both of which are 
grounded in the wage relationship.  
By contrast, there most certainly is a ‘radiant past’ for the cashiered workers of the 
decaying northeast who find both themselves and their iron rice bowls on the scrap heap. Indeed, in 
a world that has become utterly devoid of the work, livelihood, routines, cultural values, social 
solidarities and political triumphs and struggles of their formative years, these workers have little left 
but the past. Little wonder, then, that they react strongly and politically when its last remnant – a 
miserable severance package – is pilfered. 
The younger workers in adaptive political economies have a similar existential outlook to 
their generational cohort in the southeast. What they have much less of is the despotism to drive 
them from acquiescence to protest. And while many of their parents and grandparents, especially 
those unable to find or undertake work, may look back longingly for their iron rice bowls, they are 
less likely than their Manchurian cohort to have lost it utterly. Moreover, they are, if necessary, more 
likely to be able to fall back on the support of their own grown children, which is much more 
difficult in the decaying areas where their progeny are also having trouble making ends meet. 
 
DANWEI (WORK UNITS) AND SOCIAL SPACE 
The Maoist-era danwei, in which the state organized the urban population into 
work-based communities that provided employment, social services, welfare, social life, and political 
supervision and organization, proved to be a double-edged sword. It enabled the state to supervise 
the population and keep them dependent, which promoted political acquiescence and often even 
loyalty. But at moments of crisis the danwei also provided a ready source of solidarity that could fuel 
protest while also rendering it cellular. Whether during the Cultural Revolution, the 1989 
anti-government protests, or the 1999 anti-American protests against the bombing of China’s 
Belgrade Embassy, protesters tended to march under banners of their work unit. 
In the despotic factories of China’s globalized southeast, work units are gone, but they 
have been replaced by enterprises in which workers are often required to live in dormitories and eat 
in factory canteens. And while the Maoist danwei combined political appeals and mobilization as 
well as surveillance and control, factory managers, concerned almost exclusively with economic 
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control of their workforce, do not maintain such a political apparatus. It may be more likely, then, 
that, in comparison with the Maoist-era danwei, the social space of the despotic factory dormitory 
and refectory can serve to promote the development of protest when the right catalyst – which, after 
all, affects all firm employees in the community equally – comes along.12 
In the decaying northeast, especially the company towns like Daqing, cashiered workers 
generally still huddle together with their former fellow workers in their old enterprise-supplied 
housing. Some of the old danwei apparatus, such as clinics and dining halls, have fallen into disuse or 
gone commercial. And while the political apparatus of neighborhood committees often still 
functions, under the general depoliticization they exercise much less control and engage in less 
mobilization than they did in their glory days. In functional terms, the situation is broadly similar to 
that of the despotic dorms: people with identical relationships to the political economy are 
concentrated in tight, exclusive social spaces where state political surveillance and control are 
somewhat loose. And the potential implications for facilitating protest are congruent as well. 
In adaptive settings like Tianjin, the old danwei have been more thoroughly eliminated. 
Much enterprise housing has been privatized or demolished. As a result, most people no longer live 
surrounded by their present or former co-workers. Of course such a situation is much less conducive 




Here just a few well-known points can be noted. The market Leninist state’s ongoing 
monopoly of all political space – its strict prohibition against any self-organization of civil society – 
both hinders collective resistance and, when protest does occur, leaves it leaderless and disorganized 
while also driving it into the pervasive cellular pattern. Where, as in the decaying Manchurian towns 
in 2002, spontaneous resistance nonetheless threatened to metastasize, the state acts quickly and 
firmly, putting thick force on the ground. These are formidable obstacles indeed to labour protest. 
All that to the contrary notwithstanding, the state has also taken a somewhat measured 
approach to most protests. The vast majority of striking or demonstrating workers are not arrested or 
called in for political questioning – only their more obstreperous leaders are, even in cases of cellular 
protest (which comprise the vast majority). And the government generally also responds with 
material emollients to meet at least some of the protesters’ demands. This of course tends to 
encourage protest. A new ditty has arisen among disgruntled workers: ‘If you make a small ruckus, 
you’ll get small result; make a big ruckus and you’ll get a big one.’ But the state’s approach also 
discourages protest leadership, further driving resistance into the familiar wildcat, spontaneous 
pattern that quickly burns itself out. The state has shrewdly calculated that it is better off allowing 
protest that it can manage than trying to stop it altogether with hard repression and tight 
surveillance. The latter might well be impossible, and would run the risk of producing a broad 
backlash. Moreover, allowing protest provides the state with a way of learning about egregious 
hotspots so it can cope with them by rooting out avaricious or ineffective leaders while also providing 




We have already begun to explore the question of how the state responds to labour’s 
resistance to structural reform and globalization. In addition to tolerating protest, it has tried with 
some success to embed labour relations, in both domestic and foreign firms, and in enterprises 
producing both for Chinese and international markets, in a framework of legislation. And it has also 
lately begun to try to control the situation through expansion and reinvigoration of China’s 
moribund state-run labour union. 
The legislative approach began in 1995 with a comprehensive labour law. It stipulated all 
manner of regulations on working conditions, hours and overtime, while also assigning to the 
ACFTU the responsibility of reaching collective contracts between employers and employees (of 
which more anon). To this it added mediation and arbitration channels that have seen increasing 
uptake from aggrieved workers. From 2003 to 2006, the number of disputes settled by arbitration 
increased from 95,800 to 141,500, while the number settled by mediation rose from 67,800 to 
104,000.13 In 2004 the National People’s Congress passed the country’s first minimum wage law. 
And in 2008 it introduced a controversial Labour Contract Law, opposed by many employers, 
including international firms, who lobbied against it because it gave workers rights to longer-term 
contracts and protections against arbitrary dismissal. Even some academics who claimed to have 
workers’ interests at heart opposed it, arguing that it would only benefit the better-off workers who 
didn’t need such protection anyway, while endangering the less skilled, whom employers were now 
more likely to fire just before they reached eligibility for protection. 
The rise of legalism in labour relations has had several purposes. It is a genuine attempt 
to rein in the most egregious labour practices, thereby preempting serious disputes, normalizing 
factory life, and proclaiming to workers that the government is looking out for their interests. It has 
also been intended, with some success, to canalize and individualize disputation – to drive it from 
strikes and demonstrations in the factory and streets toward arbitration and mediation in 
government meeting rooms. It has functioned to provide angry workers with an organizing and 
legitimating tool. By citing the law, they become more convinced that they are justified, more able to 
persuade others, more confident, and thus bolder. Legalism also sets up the protagonists in a way 
favorable to the state, as workers cite central government documents as weapons against their 
managers and local government officials, focusing their ire on the latter rather than Beijing. Yet as 
with so much of labour politics, the legalistic approach has its dangers for the state. In the end the 
laws are rarely enforced, which is bound to shake workers’ views of the whole project and, possibly, 
begin to undermine the state’s increasingly legalistic claim to legitimacy.14 
More recently, beginning in 2006, the government seemed poised to wake up its trade 
union federation, Rip van Winkle-like, from a long sleep.15 The All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions was created in the early 1950s to bring China’s myriad, autonomous and often radical labour 
unions government control. Many union locals were involved in the strike wave of 1957, after which 
they were emasculated. Thus, the ACFTU was not a significant protagonist in the working class 
radicalism of the Cultural Revolution. Nor has it played any significant role in mediating, much less 
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advocating for or fomenting, labour protest under structural reform. In most cases, workers with 
grievances serious enough to send them into mediation, arbitration, strikes, or the streets have not 
even bothered to seek support from their labour union branches along the way. Insofar as the union 
makes any systematic effort to prevent, preempt or canalize conflict, it is only in arranging and 
administering collective contracts between workers and employer. The union’s other major role 
vis-à-vis labour politics is to monitor it, which it discharges through surveys of workers’ opinions and 
writing reports when problems flare up. And of course there are the quaint functions, left over from 
Maoist days, of organizing leisure activities and minuscule welfare funds for injured workers, holiday 
parties and the like. 
In much of the export-oriented sector, unions still do not even exist. The ACFTU has 
had difficulty keeping up with the efflorescence of new industrial enterprises since the start of the 
structural reforms in 1978, and especially since the Chinese economy and transition to capitalism, 
including labour market ‘reform’, took off in 1993.16 Foreign firms that employ Chinese labour 
either directly in their own firms or indirectly through Chinese firms with which they contract divide 
into two broad categories in their approach to this situation. Those from countries with despotic 
systems of labour relations – which tend to include those from Hong Kong, South Korea and 
Taiwan – naturally welcome it. The absence of genuine labour union organization was often a 
significant consideration in their decision to come to China in the first place. Some South Korean 
firms in particular did so in part to escape an environment of increasing challenges from their 
working class at home. On the other hand, for firms accustomed to dealing with labour unions in 
their home countries – which tend to be those from the West and even Japan with its enterprise 
unionism – Chinese unions serve the valuable role of streamlining and regularizing labour relations. 
As we have seen, the 1995 Labour Law specifies a major role for ACFTU branches in arranging 
collective contracts with workers. These firms find collective contracting attractive since it saves them 
the administrative trouble of offering, inking and implementing contracts with each individual 
worker. Having unions in their plants can also help them receive social accountability certifications 
such as SA 8000, which are required by some major Western retailers (Ngai 2003).  It is all the 
more beneficial for such employers that Chinese unions generally do little or nothing to enforce 
those contracts. 
The new leadership that came to power in 2002 and 2003 under President Hu Jintao 
and Premier Wen Jiabao placed more emphasis than Jiang Zemin had in the 1990s on the growing 
inequalities and irritants that have caused a rising drumbeat of protest during China’s transition to 
capitalism. Their ideological mantra has been the creation of a ‘harmonious society’. They thought 
that resuscitation of the country’s trade unions, especially in the foreign-invested sector, would help 
stabilize and monitor labour relations. But if it was intended to provide a counterweight to the most 
exploitative labour practices there, they began in the wrong place by taking on major international 
corporations, who were generally China’s best foreign employers. In October, 2004, the ACFTU 
published a ‘blacklist’ of global corporations – including Wal-Mart, Dell, Eastman Kodak, 
McDonald’s, and Samsung – that forbade the establishment of unions. It quickly lighted on 
Wal-Mart, the international paragon of anti-unionism, as its first victim. After a long and complex 
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battle, in which the ACFTU deployed mass mobilization tactics that the Communist Party had not 
used since the revolution, identifying pugnacious Wal-Mart employees and encouraging them to 
take the lead, by fall 2007 all Wal-Mart stores in China had union branches. In September 2008 it 
announced a further campaign to replicate the feat in all factories of Fortune 500 companies in 
China within the space of one month. The latter program fizzled, a victim of excessive goal setting 
and, no doubt, the worsening worldwide depression. 
Perhaps the ACFTU started with the biggest and best foreign employers because they 
were low-hanging fruit. At least some such firms had experience at home working with labour 
unions, though that was surely not the case with Wal-Mart. Perhaps the ACFTU counted on the fact 
that these companies, aware that they were already relatively good employers by Chinese standards, 
would not feel they had much to lose. Perhaps it was just looking to score some cheap propaganda 
points that would win favor with the Chinese people, to whom it was increasingly appealing for 
legitimacy on nationalistic grounds.17 To be sure, going after these gargantuan firms would be a great 
deal easier than tackling the thousands upon thousands of smaller manufacturers in the export sector, 
many of whom were cosseting or were cosseted by local government officials. It could well have 
strategized that starting with the great firms would make going after the others easier – in Chinese 
parlance, ‘killing the chicken to scare the monkey’. 
In the event, both the chicken and the monkey emerged unscathed; the only victim was 
the Chinese working class. The Wal-Mart unionization drive may have appeared to introduce 
something new and volatile: the mobilization of genuine worker militancy by the state. But the 
reality proved all too depressingly familiar. Within months, most Wal-Mart union branches came to 
be dominated by management, its objective ally in the local Party branches, or both. Some dispirited 
worker activists cried out in their blogs to ‘save the Wal-Mart union!’. Others accused their 
democratically elected union branch leaders of corruption, authoritarianism and sloth. As early as 
March 2008, Han Dongfang, a leading advocate for workers’ rights, was driven to abandon his 
earlier hopes, arguing that the Wal-Mart unions were mere window dressing. In the Nanchang Bayi 
Wal-Mart, Gao Haitao, an ordinary worker and elected union committee member, began militating 
when Wal-Mart shifted the cost of new year bonuses to the union and treated its required 
contribution to the union of 2 percent of the payroll as a loan. Wal-Mart pressured the Nanchang 
city-level union office to silence Gao, and also tried to create an alternative union committee under 
its control. Gao beat them back with his self-taught knowledge of the law and support he enlisted 
from the central union offices in Beijing. Membership in the Nanchang Bayi union soared, and 
workers began to organize their own fund to defend Gao and their union. Wal-Mart outfoxed Gao, 
though. In July 2008, it concluded its first collective contract with the local in Shenyang in northeast 
China, an area where workers were likely to be more compliant and the party apparatus more 
conservative and in firm control. It provided for a 9 percent wage increase to come into effect only a 
year hence, at a time when foodstuff inflation in China was running between 20 and 30 percent and 
urban wages were rising an average of 18 percent. Wal-Mart then sought to impose this contract on 
all its workers. Gao Haitao fought this move, but Wal-Mart bypassed him, getting a union chair 
from another store to sign the contract with Gao’s local. Gao has resigned his union chair in 
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disgust.18 As noted above, in China law serves to control the working class and strengthen the 
position of the state, not to provide an objective set of rules or level playing field for sorting out 




Globalization has comprised only one aspect of the Chinese structural reforms. As such, its 
effect on labour is difficult to separate analytically from that of the sweeping wider changes. 
Moreover, globalization has been unevenly distributed over the Chinese landscape. It has alighted 
with a wallop along the southern and central coasts, had much more muted and attenuated effects on 
the old northeastern industrial heartland and much of the hinterland, and left many other places in 
between. Finally, even in its areas of greatest impact, the many aspects of the labour regimes that 
have arisen – such as the dormitory system – have not been imposed directly by international firms 
or globalization’s pressures on Chinese enterprises. Rather, they are Chinese adaptations to the new 
economic institutions, opportunities and pressures. Thus it would be problematic to argue that the 
despotic capitalism that has emerged in hyper-globalized southeast China is a simple or pure product 
of globalization. 
We have identified three patterns of political economy under structural reform, each of 
which involves a distinct impact of globalization and specific effects on labour. In the southeast, a 
highly competitive form of breathlessly burgeoning export-oriented capitalism has produced a 
despotic labour regime. In the much less globalized northeast, a decaying economy has put a large 
part of the Maoist-era industrial working class out of work and left it dependent on meager handouts 
from the state. And in other areas such as Tianjin, economic development has been solid and only 
partly driven by globalization, enabling a smoother transition for labour. 
Though labour has been broadly acquiescent in all of these new political economies, its 
pattern of resistance has varied. Under despotism protest has tended to be cellular and oriented to 
the nuts and bolts battle over surplus value on the shop floor and in the pay packet. Under decay, 
resistance has been more oriented to the preservation of the last remaining shreds of labour rights 
created by state socialism, which have occasionally fueled metastatic protest across enterprise and 
geographic boundaries. In the adaptive pattern, there has been relatively less protest. While the 
specific economic relations have been major structural determinants of these differential labour 
responses, social factors (such as generation and social space) and political ones (such as the state’s 
monopoly of organization and its carrot-and-stick policy toward protesters) have also shaped the 
various patterns of protest. 
Finally, in the face of such protest, the state has adopted a three-pronged strategy. First, it 
treats outbursts with a carefully modulated combination of harshness toward protest leaders and 
tolerance and even reward toward the majority of protesters. Second, it has erected a legal 
superstructure to canalize protest and attempt to preempt it in the first place by reining in the worst 
employer practices. Third, it has reinvigorated state-run unionism for the selfsame purposes. 
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On the whole this strategy has worked. Within a very short period of time starting in 
earnest in the early 1990s, China has pulled off a profound transformation in the structure of its 
labour relations from state socialism to the capitalist wage. A working class that more than once 
undertook significant, and sometimes even furious, outbursts in defense of its interests, rights and 
privileges under Maoist state socialism has on the whole gone quietly into this new world. Along the 
way many of the victims of structural reform of the state socialist political economy have actually 
welcomed globalization in the form of foreign investment that creates jobs, despite the often 
draconian terms of such employment. 
The political economy of Chinese market Leninism faced the depression of 2008-09 with 
some important assets. The government could tap ample amounts of cash, some earned from trade 
surpluses and some from the country’s extraordinarily high savings rate. The latter is a reminder that 
the country has a massive internal market the potential of which has only begun to be developed. 
While there were fears that its 2008 growth rate would dip to 5 percent – well under the 7 percent 
needed to maintain its employment rate – in the end it racked up 9 percent. Its financial system is 
not drowning in red ink (as so many pundits predicted it would several years ago), and large 
numbers of its people are not facing foreclosures and the disappearance of their life savings. Its 
working class has already endured structural changes far more profound than a small uptick in 
unemployment. Despite the pressures that globalization and the even larger domestic aspects of the 
country’s transition to capitalism place on its proletariat, Chinese market Leninism proved better 
positioned to survive the 2008-09 depression than Western neo-liberalism. And globalization is only 





1 Ironically, the British opium trade was also an early example of Westerners using some Asians to 
help conquer others, as Nixon’s ‘Vietnamization’ would over a century later: the opium came from 
India. 
2 Calculated from China Statistical Yearbook 2002 (Beijing, China Statistics Press), table 5.22; China 
Statistical Yearbook 2007 (Beijing, China Statistics Press), table 5.26. The figures include all wages, 
not just those of workers. But assuming that the ratios of number of managers and workers, and of 
their wages, are roughly similar across provinces, the figures can provide a rough guide to the relative 
rates of increase.  
3 Of course the Chinese working class, like classes everywhere, is highly differentiated. Indeed, this 
chapter fleshes out many of the important differences. At this most general level of abstraction, it 
simply includes those who do industrial work under any sort of wage relationship.  
4 See Elizabeth Perry, ‘Shanghai’s Strike Wave of 1957’, China Quarterly 137(March): 1-27; 
Elizabeth Perry and Li Xun, Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution (Boulder: 
Westview, 1997); Wang Shaoguang, Failure of Charisma: The Cultural Revolution in Wuhan (Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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5 The commonplace term for the vast changes that have taken place in China since 1978 is ‘reform’. 
It is appropriate insofar as it refers to the fact that change has been pursued gradually and without 
violence. But ‘reform’ can hardly capture the depth and breadth of the changes themselves. Since 
1978 China has not merely been tinkering with, perfecting, or toning down Maoist state socialism. 
Something far more profound has been afoot. The country has been seeking, often successfully, to 
excise, root and branch, the basic elements of its Maoist polity, economy, society, and political 
culture. It has questioned a great deal of what went before. Its leaders and people have sought to 
create new forms of political authority, economic activity, social organization, and cultural 
expression. If revolution is defined as a ‘basic transformation of a society’s state and class structures’ 
(Skocpol 1979: 4), then what China has been undergoing is no mere ‘reform’, but rather something 
that would more aptly be called a peaceful revolution. Another, perhaps less oxymoronic, term is 
structural reform. 
6 For more details, see Anita Chan, China’s Workers Under Assault (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe 2001). 
7 William Hurst has shown that even economically viable state-run firms in the rustbelt came under 
political pressure to lay off workers; see William Hurst, The Chinese Worker After Socialism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
8 See Lee, Against the Law, Part II; and Marc Blecher, A World to Lose: Working Class Formation in 
Twentieth-Century China (book manuscript in progress). 
9 See Blecher, A World to Lose: Working Class Formation in Twentieth-Century China (book 
manuscript in progress). 
10 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York, Vintage, 1966); James 
Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). 
11 Author’s interviews, Tianjin, 1995-99. Subsequent visits and discussions with social scientists there 
confirm that the situation remains the same if not even more pronounced a decade on. 
12 Lee, Against the Law, 2007. Of course factory-based dormitory housing is not a necessary feature of 
globalized despotism. Managers could just as easily not provide it and allow their workers to live 
off-site, assuming that the housing market would deliver appropriate supply (which it surely would – 
and often does – in China where the demand from workers exists). It is an interesting question, 
though, whether such off-site housing would be more or less conducive to collective mobilization. 
13 China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing, China Statistics Press, various years). 
14 On this whole complicated question, see Ching Kwan Lee, Against the Law. 
15 Some of the following discussion draws upon Marc Blecher, ‘When Wal-Mart Wimped Out’, 
Critical Asian Studies 40(2): 263-276. 
16 According to official statistics, the number of trade union branches in China declined from 
627,000 in 1993 to 509,000 in 1999. (Statistical Yearbook of China 2003, table 23-4.) [Figures for 
subsequent years gyrate wildly, and are highly suspect. The source contains a footnote referring to 
the need for statistical adjustment in 2003.] The figures on union staff are steadier and, accordingly, 
more credible. They dropped from 554,000 in 1993 to 465,000 in 2003. 
17 Witness its support for 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations, the Tibet crackdown of 2008, and, of 
course, the Olympics. 
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